HSC Modern History Mastery Pack

The Policy of Appeasement: Definition, Origins and Rationale

Appeasement, in the context of British and French foreign policy during the 1930s, refers to the deliberate strategy of making concessions to an aggressor power — in this case Nazi Germany — in the hope of satisfying its grievances and averting another European war. The term has acquired an almost universally pejorative meaning in retrospect, but understanding it requires situating the policy within the political, military, economic and psychological landscape of inter-war Europe.

The policy had deep structural roots. The memory of the First World War — approximately 750,000 British dead, 1.4 million French dead — made any repetition of total war politically unthinkable for democratic governments answerable to electorates. Public opinion polls in Britain throughout the 1930s consistently showed majority support for negotiated settlement over rearmament-led confrontation. The 1933 Oxford Union resolution — "This house will in no circumstances fight for King and Country" — was a cultural signpost, however contested its representativeness.

Additionally, genuine moral sympathy for German grievances existed across the British political class. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 was widely regarded, even by its architects, as punitive and inherently unstable. The economist John Maynard Keynes had published The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) arguing strenuously that reparations would destabilise Europe; his argument had permeated elite opinion by the 1930s. If Germany's complaints about ethnic Germans outside its borders, about territorial losses, and about military restrictions had some moral legitimacy, then satisfying them by negotiation rather than coercion could appear statesmanlike rather than cowardly.

A third structural driver was imperial overstretch. Britain's strategic commitments spanned the globe — India, the Middle East, the Far East (where Japan was already aggressive), and domestic social pressures from the Depression. The Chiefs of Staff repeatedly warned Cabinet that Britain could not simultaneously fight Germany, Italy and Japan. Appeasement bought time for rearmament and reduced the risk of a three-front scenario.

France's position was shaped by its own distinctive vulnerabilities. With a stagnant population relative to Germany, scarred memories of 1914–18 even more acute than Britain's, economic weakness from the Depression, and profound domestic political polarisation between left and right, France's will and capacity for confrontation were severely limited. French strategic culture under the Third Republic increasingly favoured the defensive (the Maginot Line mentality) and dependence on the British alliance — making French policy largely a follower of British initiatives during the critical 1936–1938 period.

Neville Chamberlain and the Architecture of Appeasement 1937–1938

Neville Chamberlain became British Prime Minister in May 1937 and immediately placed himself at the centre of foreign policy in a manner unprecedented for a peacetime prime minister. He distrusted the Foreign Office and conducted back-channel diplomacy through personal envoys (most notably Sir Horace Wilson). His approach was not naive; it was systematic, driven by a clear strategic theory.

Chamberlain's core belief was that Hitler's aims were finite and rational — that Germany sought revision of specific Versailles injustices rather than unlimited continental conquest. He believed that a frank, leader-to-leader engagement could identify Germany's concrete demands, satisfy the legitimate ones, and tie Hitler into a framework of international responsibility that would constrain future behaviour. This was a theory of deterrence-through-engagement rather than deterrence-through-strength.

His strategic calculation had four components:

• Rearmament as backstop: Chamberlain did significantly accelerate British rearmament after 1937, particularly in air defence (Fighter Command benefited enormously from the 1935–1938 investment cycle that produced the Hurricane and Spitfire). Appeasement was partly meant to buy the time this rearmament required.
• Avoiding the Soviet entanglement: Chamberlain was deeply suspicious of Soviet intentions and unwilling to construct the Franco-Soviet-British alliance that Churchill advocated. He feared that an eastern alliance would give Stalin a veto over European peace and potentially drag Britain into a war on Soviet terms.
• Colonial and economic concessions as alternatives to territorial concession: Chamberlain initially hoped to satisfy Hitler through colonial discussions and economic cooperation, reducing the pressure for territorial demands in Europe.
• Personal diplomacy as decisive instrument: Chamberlain genuinely believed that no predecessor had actually sat across a table from Hitler and engaged him directly. His three personal visits to Germany in September 1938 — unprecedented in British diplomatic history — reflected this conviction.

Worked example — the Hossbach Memorandum context: In November 1937, Hitler told his senior commanders (recorded in what became known as the Hossbach Memorandum) that Germany must achieve Lebensraum in the east by force by the mid-1940s at the latest. Chamberlain was not privy to this document, which was only recovered after the war. Historians use this document to demonstrate that Hitler's aims were expansionist and time-limited by his own reckoning — not the moderately revisionist programme Chamberlain assumed he was dealing with. This asymmetry of information is important when evaluating how culpable Chamberlain was for his misjudgements.